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Under Art. 28 GDPR — Etchify

Data Processing Agreement (DPA)

Version: 14 November 2026

Diese Vereinbarung wird in deutscher und englischer Sprache bereitgestellt; maßgeblich ist die deutsche Fassung.

This agreement is provided in German and English; the German version prevails.

Preamble

This agreement governs the processing of personal data by the processor on behalf of the controller in connection with the use of the Shopify application Etchify.

The controller is the operator of the Shopify store (“merchant”) who installs Etchify.

The processor is:

Valerian Huber, sole proprietorship
(address as stated in the legal notice at etchify.app)
Data protection: privacy@etchify.app · Support: support@etchify.app
Data protection officer: dsb@alpin-code.de

Conclusion of the agreement

This agreement is concluded through acceptance in the Etchify admin: the merchant confirms it there expressly (checkbox, never pre-ticked); the acceptance is recorded with the version and time. Until acceptance, the processor does not accept any order data from end customers. Designs that arrive nonetheless are kept blocked without further processing for at most 30 days and deleted if no acceptance has taken place by then. The agreement is available on this page and in the application under Settings → Data & privacy. It is not negotiated individually, as the application is provided in a standardised form through the Shopify App Store. Anyone who needs different terms should contact privacy@etchify.app before accepting.

Insofar as it concerns the processing of personal data, this agreement takes precedence over the terms of service.

Changes to this agreement

The processor communicates new versions of this agreement, with a list of changes, in text form to the shop’s email address or, if provided, to the address voluntarily given at acceptance, and in the Etchify admin. A new version applies 30 days after receipt unless the controller objects within this period. If it objects, the previous version continues to apply, and it may terminate with effect from the date the new version would take effect.

§ 1 Subject matter, nature and purpose of the processing

The subject matter is the provision of a product configurator for engraved and printed products within the controller’s Shopify store.

The purpose of the processing is solely the provision of this service:

  • Configuring products (engraving areas, materials, shapes, price surcharges)
  • Storing and delivering the designs created by end customers
  • Passing the configuration to the order in the controller’s store
  • Providing the administration interface for the controller
  • Support at the controller’s request

Any use of the data for the processor’s own purposes is excluded, in particular for profiling, for disclosure to third parties for advertising purposes or for training AI models.

Duration: Processing takes place for as long as the application is installed. It ends when the application is uninstalled; the consequences are governed by § 9.

§ 2 Type of data and categories of data subjects

Categories of data subjects

  • End customers of the controller who use the configurator or place orders
  • Staff of the controller who operate the administration interface
  • Third parties named by end customers in engravings or lists of values

Categories of personal data

CategoryExamples
Order-related dataOrder and line item references, selected configuration
Content entered by end customersEngraving texts, uploaded image files
Usage dataTime of configuration, technical connection data
Contact and request dataEmail address, name, message, list of values (may contain names of third parties), IP address, Shopify customer ID
Identifiers of the controllerStore domain, store owner identifier, the shop’s email address

Note on engraving texts and uploads: End customers can fill these fields freely. They may enter names, dates or images of people, including content the controller does not expect. The processor treats this content as personal data throughout. The controller ensures that it has a legal basis for collecting this content and, where necessary, advises end customers not to enter special categories of personal data (Art. 9 GDPR).

No payment data is processed. Billing runs through Shopify Billing; the processor receives no card or account data.

§ 3 Instructions

The processor processes personal data only on documented instructions from the controller. This agreement and the controller’s configuration and use of the application count as instructions.

Individual instructions must be sent in text form to privacy@etchify.app.

The processor immediately informs the controller if, in its opinion, an instruction infringes the GDPR or other Union or Member State data protection provisions. It may suspend carrying out the instruction until the controller confirms or changes it.

Processing required by Union or Member State law remains permitted; the processor informs the controller beforehand unless that law prohibits it.

§ 4 Confidentiality

The processor only uses persons for the processing who have committed themselves to confidentiality or are under an appropriate statutory obligation of confidentiality. The obligation continues after their work ends.

Transparency note: The processor is a sole proprietorship. Only the owner has access to production data. No other persons are engaged; should this change, the first sentence applies.

§ 5 Technical and organisational measures (Art. 32)

The processor takes the measures described in Annex 2 (TOMs) and maintains them for the term of the agreement.

The measures may be developed further as long as the level of protection is not reduced. Material changes are documented.

The annex also expressly names open points, so the controller can base its risk assessment on complete information.

§ 6 Sub-processors (Art. 28(2) and (4))

The controller gives its general authorisation to engage the sub-processors listed in Annex 1.

Before adding or replacing a sub-processor, the processor informs the controller in text form 30 days in advance. The controller may object to a change within 30 days of being informed. If the parties do not reach agreement, the controller may terminate the agreement with effect from the date of the change.

Where the processor engages a sub-processor, it imposes on it by contract the same data protection obligations as apply to the processor under this agreement, in particular sufficient guarantees to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures in such a manner that the processing meets the requirements of the GDPR. Where a sub-processor fails to fulfil its data protection obligations, the processor remains fully liable to the controller for the performance of the sub-processor’s obligations.

Clarification on the Shopify platform: Shopify is not a sub-processor but the platform the controller has chosen itself and with which it has its own contract. See Annex 1, section 2a.

§ 7 Data subject rights

The processor assists the controller with appropriate measures in responding to requests from data subjects (Art. 15–22 GDPR).

If a data subject contacts the processor directly, the processor forwards the request to the controller without undue delay and does not answer it itself.

Access, rectification, erasure and restriction are possible through the application’s administration interface. Where a request cannot be handled there, the processor assists on request.

§ 8 Notification duties and assistance (Art. 32–36)

The processor notifies the controller of any personal data breach without undue delay and no later than 24 hours after becoming aware of it.

The short period is deliberate: the controller’s 72-hour period for notifying the supervisory authority (Art. 33(1)) starts with this notification.

As far as known, the notification contains: the nature of the incident, the categories of data concerned and the approximate number of data subjects, the time of occurrence and discovery, the likely consequences and the measures taken and planned. An incomplete first notification is permitted and will be supplemented.

The processor does not notify the supervisory authority itself; that is the controller’s responsibility.

On request, the processor assists with data protection impact assessments (Art. 35) and prior consultations (Art. 36), insofar as the required information originates from its sphere.

The internal procedure is described in Annex 3 (incident response plan).

§ 9 Retention, deletion and return

During the term: On the controller’s instructions, the processor keeps ordered designs (design data, uploaded images, previews, production details) until the end of the third calendar year after delivery (the delivery date in Shopify, otherwise the order date) and deletes them afterwards. The purpose is the handling of warranty claims and complaints by the controller. The controller can set the period in the application between 1 and 10 years and hold individual orders; these settings count as instructions. The period applies only while the application is installed.

On the controller’s instructions, the following periods apply to other data:

  • Designs not ordered: 90 days after the last change (adjustable in the application); a draft the end customer deletes is removed for good after 30 days.
  • Copy created via a “Reorder” link: deleted after 7 days if not opened, otherwise treated like a design not ordered.
  • Bulk order requests: 180 days after completion or rejection, open requests 365 days after receipt, each together with the related design not ordered.
  • Logs by purpose: technical error logs 90 days; data protection records (metadata only) 3 years from the end of the calendar year in which they were handled; security events 1 year; AI and merchant changes 90 days; billing events 3 years from the end of the calendar year in which they were handled. Server logs are overwritten on a rolling basis once they reach 30 MB.

Reports via “Report this problem” are processed by the processor as a controller in its own right solely to fix errors (Art. 28(10) GDPR). Reports from end customers contain no contact data; the reports are deleted together with the store’s data.

After the application is uninstalled, this period and any hold end. All data of the store is deleted, including ordered designs; the records in the last paragraph of this section are excepted:

TimeStep
ImmediatelyThe application’s access to the store ends
48 hours after uninstallingShopify sends the deletion request (shop/redact); the production data is deleted as soon as it arrives
No later than 30 days after uninstallingFinal deletion of the production data, even if no deletion request has been received
At most 35 days after deletionKept in our own encrypted backup copies, then removed automatically

If the controller reinstalls the application before the deletion, the data is kept. Deleted data and files remain in our own encrypted backup copies for at most 35 days and are then removed automatically. If a technical fault delays the deletion, we complete it as soon as the fault has been fixed.

Before uninstalling, the controller can export the production files of its orders and the data of its store itself in the application. Until the deletion, it can request immediate deletion (privacy@etchify.app) or request an export of its data; the export is provided in a common, machine-readable format.

Statutory retention obligations remain unaffected. Such data is blocked and not processed further.

For its own evidence purposes (Art. 5(2), Art. 17(3)(e) GDPR) the processor keeps only the following beyond uninstallation: the acceptance record (Shopify user ID, version, time, checksum of the text; name and email only if provided voluntarily) until the end of the third calendar year after the end of the contract, metadata on the handling of data protection requests and billing events each for 3 years from the end of the calendar year in which they were handled, security events for 1 year. For this data the processor is itself the controller.

§ 10 Evidence and audits

On request, the processor provides the controller with the information needed to demonstrate compliance with Art. 28, in particular this agreement with its annexes and the current version of the TOMs.

Audits are primarily carried out by providing this evidence. An on-site audit is possible with reasonable advance notice, during normal business hours and without unreasonable disruption of operations; it may be carried out by an auditor bound to confidentiality.

The processor points out that it holds no certification (such as ISO 27001) and does not claim one.

§ 11 Place of processing and transfers to third countries

Processing takes place in the European Union unless stated otherwise in Annex 1.

For the sub-processors listed there that are based outside the EU, the mechanism under Chapter V GDPR is stated per provider in Annex 1.

§ 12 Liability and final provisions

Art. 82 GDPR applies. Otherwise, liability is governed by the terms of service; any limitation does not apply to intent and gross negligence or to claims of data subjects.

The law of the Federal Republic of Germany applies.

Amendments require text form. If a provision is invalid, the rest of the agreement remains valid; the invalid provision is replaced by the statutory rule.

In the event of conflicts between this agreement and the terms of service, this agreement prevails insofar as the processing of personal data is concerned.

Annexes

The annexes form part of this agreement: Annex 1, approved sub-processors; Annex 2, technical and organisational measures; Annex 3, incident response plan (procedure for § 8). They follow below.

Change history

DateChange
2026-08-01First version.
2026-11-11AI connection: AI program connected by the merchant as a recipient at the merchant’s instigation (Annex 1 no. 2), OAuth connections and confirmation rule described more precisely in Annex 2.
2026-11-14Single version of the agreement, German and English with the German version prevailing; annexes also in English. § 3 immediate information on an unlawful instruction. § 6 objection without stating reasons with a right to terminate, same data protection obligations for sub-processors and liability. § 9 retention of ordered designs only during the term, deletion with shop/redact, backup copies at most 35 days. Contact: data protection officer and privacy@etchify.app. Annex 1, correction: Hetzner (backups) added; already in use, previously named only in the privacy policy. Hostinger with its full name instead of a server name. GlitchTip as self-hosted error tracking on the backend server, personal fields are removed before sending (Annex 2). § 2 extended by contact and request data, transfer mechanism per provider in Annex 1, uploaded files in Supabase storage, other periods as instructions in § 9.

Annex 1 — Approved sub-processors (Art. 28(4) GDPR)

Version: 14 November 2026

Allocation of roles in a Shopify app: The merchant (store operator) is the controller for its customers’ data. Etchify (sole proprietorship Valerian Huber) is its processor. The services listed here are therefore sub-processors within the meaning of Art. 28(4); the merchant must be able to approve them or object to them.

The current version of the list is Annex 1 of this agreement; adding or replacing a sub-processor is announced in text form 30 days in advance under § 6 of this agreement.

1. Active sub-processors (processing merchant or end-customer personal data)

Sub-processorPurposeData categoriesSeat / place of processingThird countryDPA responsibility
Supabase Pte. Ltd. (Singapore); Supabase, Inc. (USA) only as a sub-processor for supportPrimary database of the app (store configurations, designs, order references) and storage for uploaded filesStore identity, merchant configuration, design data, order references, uploaded files (storage)Project region eu-north-1 (AWS Stockholm, EU); provider seat Singaporeyes (support access SG/US) → SCCs, no DPFEtchify (app’s own DPA)
Vercel Inc. (USA)Delivery of the web interface of the app and of the website (app.etchify.app, etchify.app)Visitors’ access and connection data, delivered contentUS provider, global edgeyes → DPF, alternatively SCCsEtchify (Vercel DPA). Applies as long as the Etchify team has a Pro or Enterprise plan with Vercel; the Vercel DPA applies only to these plans.
Plus Five Five, Inc. (Resend), USATransactional email (notifications to merchants)Email address, message contentUS provider (sent via AWS SES, EU region)yes → DPF and SCCsEtchify (account-wide DPA)
Hostinger International Ltd. (Cyprus)Server for the backend api.etchify.app, cron jobs and encrypted backup copiesAll data processed by the backend, encrypted backup copiesEU (data centre Frankfurt, Germany)Seat in the EU; onward transfers by Hostinger → SCCsEtchify (DPA with the provider in place)
Hetzner Online GmbH (Germany)Encrypted off-site backup copies (object storage with deletion lock)Encrypted backup copies of all processed dataEU (Falkenstein, Germany)no (EU)Etchify (DPA with the provider in place)

2. Not listed as external sub-processors (with reasons)

ServiceReason
GlitchTip (self-hosted error monitoring)Operated in-house by the same legal entity on the backend server at Hostinger (no. 1), no external recipient. Personal fields are removed before sending (Annex 2, no. 3).
Own invoicing componentInvoicing and number-range authority of the same controller entity (sole proprietorship V. Huber); internal to the business, no disclosure to a third party.
Own CI (Woodpecker)Processes source code, no merchant personal data → does not belong in the customer DPA annex. Prerequisite: no personal data in CI logs or artefacts.
Operations monitoringThe operator’s own monitoring within the same entity. Receives operating metrics (counts, health), no merchant end-customer data.
AI program connected by the merchant (e.g. OpenAI for ChatGPT, Anthropic for Claude)Recipient at the merchant’s instigation, not a sub-processor of Etchify. The merchant sets up the connection and chooses the provider; Etchify releases the data only on the merchant’s instructions. Retrieving orders may include end-customer content (note to the store, design preview), but no names, email addresses, postal addresses or phone numbers. The merchant remains responsible for choosing the provider, any third-country transfer and informing its end customers.

2a. The merchant’s platform

Shopify (Shopify International Ltd., Ireland; parent company Shopify Inc., Canada) is not a sub-processor of Etchify. Shopify is the platform the merchant has chosen itself and with which it has its own contract. Etchify receives data through Shopify’s interface and sends data back to it (such as product and variant configuration, metafields); what Shopify does with this data is governed by the contract between the merchant and Shopify. Etchify reads and writes there only on the merchant’s instructions.

3. Third-country transfers (Art. 44 et seq. GDPR)

Supabase, Vercel and Resend are based outside the EU (Singapore or the USA).

  • Supabase: The contracting party is Supabase Pte. Ltd. (Singapore). The database itself is located, as measured, in eu-north-1 (AWS Stockholm). The transfer results from the provider’s seat and possible support access (Singapore, USA), not from the storage location; the basis is standard contractual clauses.
  • Vercel: The contracting party is Vercel Inc. (USA); delivery of the web interface of the app and of the website via a global edge network, plus visitors’ connection data. The basis is the EU-US Data Privacy Framework, alternatively standard contractual clauses.
  • Resend: According to the provider, sending via AWS SES in an EU region; provider seat US.

The transfer mechanism for each provider is stated in the table under no. 1.

4. Duty to change and inform

A new or replaced sub-processor requires prior information of the merchants including the right to object (Art. 28(2)). The processor informs before every change under § 6.


Annex 2 — Technical and organisational measures (Art. 32 GDPR)

Version: 14 November 2026

Annex to the DPA between the merchant (controller) and Etchify, sole proprietorship Valerian Huber (processor).

Principle of this document: only evidenced measures. Every line is either measured, proven in the code or monitored by a running watcher. What is missing is stated openly in section 6. A TOM document that promises more than operations deliver is worse in the event of damage than an honest one.

1. Confidentiality (Art. 32(1)(b))

1.1 Physical access control

No hardware of our own. Processing takes place exclusively in the data centres of the contractors (Hostinger in Frankfurt, AWS eu-north-1 via Supabase, Vercel Edge). Physical security is contractually the responsibility of these providers; evidence via their certifications (ISO 27001 or similar).

1.2 System access control

  • Server access exclusively via SSH with a key pair; password login and root login are disabled, continuously monitored by the server hardening monitoring.
  • Open network ports are recorded continuously; unexpected exposure raises an alarm.
  • Operating system security updates are monitored.
  • Access to the contractors’ administration interfaces via personal accounts with two-factor authentication.

1.3 Data access control

  • Tenant separation is the central safeguard: every store is a separate tenant; the database enforces the separation through row-level security policies (Supabase/PostgreSQL). A monitoring check continuously checks their effectiveness against the live database.
  • Application access uses Shopify session tokens (JWT); the store’s identity is resolved on the server, not taken from client input.
  • The machine interface (/api/v1/*, also used for AI access) works with API keys or OAuth connections per store and acts exclusively in the context of that one tenant. The merchant grants the permissions (read, change set-up, change prices); on uninstallation, keys and connections are revoked immediately.
  • Database roles separated by purpose: the runtime role has no DDL rights; the backup role is a pure read-only role without superuser or write rights.

1.4 Separation control

  • Production and development environments run on separate infrastructure (application server at Hostinger in Frankfurt versus a separate development server that holds only data of test and development stores).
  • Test and demonstration data are marked as such in the application and kept separate from revenue and operating figures.

1.5 Pseudonymisation / data minimisation

  • For abuse prevention, IP addresses are stored hashed rather than in plain text (ip_hash in the log data).
  • No payment data is processed; billing runs through Shopify Billing, and Etchify receives no card or account data.

2. Integrity (Art. 32(1)(b))

2.1 Transfer control

  • Transport encryption TLS for all connections; HSTS is active (max-age=63072000, measured 2026-08-01).
  • Security headers at the delivery point: X-Frame-Options: DENY, Content-Security-Policy, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
  • Credentials are never stored in the source code. They are kept in encrypted storage and rolled out through a controlled handover path; a watcher reports credentials with insufficient file permissions.

2.2 Input control

  • Database changes are made through versioned migrations (numbered consecutively, 225 files as of 2026-08-01), so every schema change is traceable.
  • Changes to the application go through version control with full history.
  • Write access through the AI interface is stored as a proposal (pending_ai_mutations). If a change affects something already on sale, it takes effect only after explicit confirmation in the interface; the merchant can require confirmation for every change made by a connection. When in doubt, the system asks.

2.3 Abuse prevention

  • Rate limiting on the authentication and interface paths (Flask-Limiter); the limit deliberately applies before authentication so that unauthenticated request floods are also limited.
  • Upstream attack protection at the network edge for the self-hosted components (CrowdSec); the frontends sit behind the hosting provider’s protection infrastructure.
  • File uploads are checked for type and size; on at least one path a content-based check takes place (magic-byte validation, removal of embedded metadata). → Harmonisation open, see section 6.

3. Availability and resilience (Art. 32(1)(b), (c))

  • Daily backup of the database as a separate logical dump independent of the provider; in addition, the provider’s own backups.
  • Copy to a second system (separate host), encrypted off-site copy with a 30-day deletion lock, released afterwards. Deleted data remains in our own backup copies for at most 35 days.
  • Weekly restore test: the backup is loaded into a disposable database and the number of restored tables and records is counted. A test below the minimum values counts as failed and raises an alarm. (Evidence 2026-08-01: 81 tables, 7,369 records restored.)
  • Round-the-clock monitoring: availability check every 5 minutes (2,029 checks in seven days, 2,029 of them successful). Outages raise an alarm.
  • Error logs in a self-hosted GlitchTip on the backend server (no external recipient); personal fields are removed before sending.
  • Dead man’s switch for backups: if confirmation of a backup run fails to arrive, the watcher raises an alarm, so a failed backup job is not hidden by silence.

4. Procedure for regular review (Art. 32(1)(d))

  • Dependency audit of all program libraries (daily, rated by actual production relevance rather than raw count).
  • Database configuration check for policy and permission errors.
  • Independent review instance: the application is checked by an instance separate from development (operator cockpit) against a catalogue of release criteria; security and data protection criteria are marked as blocking.
  • Expiry of evidence: review results carry an expiry date and must be renewed. Evidence without expiry counts as a deficiency.

5. Processor control

  • Sub-processors are listed exhaustively in Annex 1 (sub-processors).
  • The register is kept centrally; a watcher detects newly added external services so the annex does not become outdated unnoticed.

6. Gaps stated openly (as of 2026-08-01)

These points are not met and are disclosed deliberately:

  1. No external penetration test. Reason: proportionality before market entry. Instead, ongoing automated checks (section 4). Review again: with the first real revenue.
  2. Upload checks are not uniform. The content-based check exists on one path; the others check file extension and size. Harmonisation has been commissioned.
  3. No formal certification (ISO 27001, TISAX or similar), neither sought nor claimed.
  4. Deletion concept is defined through the provider and backup periods (backups: at most 35 days after deletion, automatic), but not written up as a separate document.
  5. Email authentication is fully set up (SPF, DKIM, DMARC), but the DMARC policy is p=none (monitoring mode) and therefore not yet enforcing.

7. Change history

DateChange
2026-08-01First version. Basis: measured actual infrastructure.
2026-11-14No. 3: error logs in self-hosted GlitchTip, personal fields are removed before sending.

Annex 3 — Incident response plan

Version: 1 August 2026

Operating document for handling security incidents and personal data breaches (Art. 33, 34 GDPR).

Written for real operations: a one-person business with automated monitoring. There is no round-the-clock operations centre, and the plan does not pretend there is one. What it does: it ensures that in an emergency nobody has to think about whom to inform and when.

1. The most important clarification of roles

Towards merchants, Etchify is a processor, not a controller.

Consequences in an emergency:

TaskWho
Notification of the supervisory authority (Art. 33(1))the merchant, not Etchify
Communication to the data subjects (Art. 34)the merchant
Notification of the merchant without undue delay (Art. 33(2))Etchify
Supporting the merchant with informationEtchify

The most common mistake would be to notify the supervisory authority ourselves. That is not our role and would blur responsibilities. Our duty is to notify the merchant without undue delay, without the culpable delay that eats up its 72-hour period.

If an incident concerns only data of our own business (such as the operator’s credentials), Etchify is itself the controller and notifies itself where required.

2. What a notifiable incident is

A breach exists in the event of a loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability of personal data. Specifically for this application:

ClassExampleNotify immediately?
Unauthorised accessTenant separation broken: one store sees another store’s datayes, immediately
Data exfiltrationDatabase dump or credentials outside our controlyes, immediately
Compromised credentialsA provider key disclosedyes, immediately
Data lossRecords irretrievably gone (backup does not help)yes, immediately
Loss of availabilityProlonged outage of the appAssessed by duration and impact
Pure operating error without personal dataDisplay error, failed deploymentno, normal error handling

When in doubt: notify. An unnecessary notification to the merchant does not cost trust; an omitted one does.

3. Procedure

Stage 1 — Detect (automated)

The signs usually come from watchers, not from people:

SignalWatcher
Policy or permission errors in the database (tenant separation!)database check
Unexpected open network port, SSH password login, root loginserver hardening
Credentials with overly broad file permissionsserver hardening (credential files)
Backup failed or restore failedbackup monitoring
App unreachableavailability check (every 5 minutes)
New vulnerability in program librariesdependency check
Application errorsself-hosted error tracking

In addition: reports from merchants to support@etchify.app and notices from Shopify.

Stage 2 — Assess (target: 1 hour)

Four questions, in this order:

  1. Is personal data affected? If not → normal error handling; the plan ends here.
  2. Which tenants? One, several, all? The merchant needs to know whether it is affected.
  3. Which data categories and roughly how many data subjects?
  4. Is it still ongoing? An ongoing exfiltration is stopped first, then documented.

Take notes from the first moment: time, observation, measure. Not out of formalism: the merchant needs this timeline for its own notification, and nobody reconstructs it accurately from memory later.

Stage 3 — Contain

Depending on the situation, typically in this order:

  1. Rotate affected credentials (keys, tokens, database access).
  2. Switch off the affected path if the exfiltration would otherwise continue; a temporarily unavailable feature is better than an ongoing data leak.
  3. Secure evidence before cleaning up: copy the logs away. Whoever repairs first destroys the trail.
  4. In case of data loss: restore from backup (daily, tested weekly).

Stage 4 — Notify

To the merchant, without undue delay, even if the picture is still incomplete. A first notification saying “we do not know everything yet” is permitted and right; a late complete one is not.

The notification contains (along the lines of Art. 33(3)):

  • Nature of the incident, data categories concerned, approximate number of data subjects
  • Time of occurrence and discovery
  • Likely consequences
  • Measures taken and planned
  • Contact for questions

Channel: email to the shop’s email address or, if provided, to the address voluntarily given at acceptance; where several merchants are affected, also a notice in the app.

Stage 5 — Follow up

Within one week after completion:

  1. Root cause analysis: not “what happened” but “why did nobody notice it earlier”.
  2. Add watchers if no signal existed. An incident that raised no alarm is first of all a gap in monitoring.
  3. Record the lesson in the portfolio register so the case also reaches other apps.
  4. Update this document if the procedure has proven impractical.

4. Deadlines at a glance

StepTarget
Detection → first assessment1 hour from awareness
Containment started4 hours
Notification of affected merchantswithout undue delay, no later than 24 hours from awareness
Follow-up completed7 days

The 24 hours are deliberately shorter than the merchant’s 72 hours: it needs lead time for its own notification. Its period starts with our notification.

5. Contacts

RoleContact
Responsible for operationsValerian Huber
Merchant contactsupport@etchify.app
Data protectionprivacy@etchify.app
Data protection officerdsb@alpin-code.de
Backend hostingHostinger (support account)
DatabaseSupabase (support account)
Frontend hostingVercel (support account)
PlatformShopify Partner Support

Competent supervisory authority for the operator: the state data protection authority at the business seat; relevant only if Etchify is itself the controller (section 1).

6. Limits stated honestly

  1. No 24/7 on-call. At night and at weekends detection may be delayed. The automated watchers run continuously and send push notifications; the response depends on one person.
  2. Not rehearsed. This plan has never been run through. An unrehearsed plan is considerably slower in an emergency than a rehearsed one. → Section 7.
  3. No forensic tools. A deeper incident would require external support; this is not prepared today.

7. Recommended exercise (30 minutes, not blocking launch)

A desk run-through, without any real change to production:

Suppose the database check reports that a tenant separation policy is missing on a table, and the access log shows requests from another store.

Run through it: whom do I inform, in what order, with what text, and how do I establish which merchants are affected? That last question takes longest in an emergency and is cheapest to settle beforehand.

8. Change history

DateChange
2026-08-01First version. Clarification of the processor role, real watchers as detection sources, limits stated openly.